[Lude Press | Dr. Yan Talks] Big News! Georgia has arrested a Chinese group smuggling high-priced uranium, confirming “nuclear proliferation.” What does this mean? 10/27/2025

Video link: https://www.youtube.com/live/rWrHISgKeNs?si=uo1hi7ulC5KBQ6-u

01 | Summary of the Incident: Chinese Group Caught Smuggling High-Priced Uranium in Georgia
The Georgian State Security Service announced that it has detained three citizens of the People’s Republic of China who attempted to illegally purchase about 2 kilograms of uranium for USD 400,000. The uranium was classified as nuclear material.

The suspects planned to complete the deal in Georgia first, and then transport the material through Russia into China. The arrests were made during the negotiation stage of the transaction.

Although the suspects were caught with both the money and the material, all three denied the charges.

Authorities stated that “the group has other members in China who were coordinating their criminal activity.”

It has not yet been disclosed which isotope they were attempting to purchase, nor what the intended purpose of the uranium was.

In July this year, the Georgian State Security Service also arrested two individuals (a Georgian national and a Turkish national) who attempted to trade USD 3 million worth of uranium.

02 | This Is Extremely Serious — This Is Not Ordinary Smuggling; It Concerns International Nuclear Security
Buying nuclear materials on the black market is already a strategic-level crime. No matter which uranium isotope is involved, it can be used to produce:

dirty bombs,
nuclear fuel,
nuclear weapons,
military-grade nuclear technology leakage.
Any black-market transaction involving nuclear materials is automatically tied to terrorism, intelligence operations, and nuclear proliferation.

Georgia’s geographic position is crucial:
To the north it borders Russia (relations are poor); to the west is Turkey; to the south Armenia and Azerbaijan; and beyond that is Iran. Georgia’s relationship with the PRC is also not good.

The planned transport route was reportedly:
Georgia ➔ Russia ➔ China

This has already triggered international alarm chains:

This is not a normal smuggling route — it is a strategically planned corridor, clearly orchestrated by actors with intelligence or military backgrounds.
All three suspects are Chinese citizens, and they had accomplices coordinating from inside China, which escalates the case from simple black-market activity to an incident involving state-level geopolitics, sensitive diplomacy, and intelligence operations.
This now warrants a joint investigation involving the U.S., the EU, and the IAEA.
The accusation of nuclear proliferation by the Chinese Communist Party gains concrete evidence — allowing the U.S. to add another item under “China as a nuclear-proliferation risk state.”
NATO can also intervene since Georgia is a NATO partner country.
Georgia’s early detection and their rapid public disclosure indicates direct intelligence-sharing between the U.S., Europe, and Georgia.

Russia is involved in the route. Beijing’s willingness to use Russia as a transit hub (similar to using Mexican drug networks for fentanyl) reflects delicate geopolitical coordination.

Smuggling nuclear material is far more severe than fentanyl or viruses — those involved must be tied to the PLA General Staff Department / Central Liaison, not the United Front, and they would have undergone specialized training.

What is publicly disclosed is likely just the surface.
But even from the surface alone, this already confirms Beijing’s intent to expand its nuclear capabilities and implicates a global nuclear-proliferation network.

03 | Why This Incident Confirms CCP Nuclear Proliferation — Most Likely: The CCP Was Not Buying Uranium, but Selling It

◉ What does “2 kilograms of uranium” mean from an intelligence and military perspective?
Two kilograms of uranium is extraordinarily sensitive and strategically valuable.
This is absolutely not a private smuggling case — it has all the hallmarks of a state-backed, organized CCP intelligence operation.
2 kg is not enough to build a nuclear warhead (which requires tens of kilograms),
but it is more than enough to make a dirty bomb — capable of causing localized long-term contamination with cleanup costs reaching hundreds of millions of dollars.
The material will definitely undergo isotope analysis, purity testing, and source tracing.
A $400,000 cash transaction:
Anyone who can show up in Georgia with that amount of cash is clearly on a CCP intelligence mission.
The multi-country transit route has all the characteristics of a state-level intelligence “de-identification” operation.

◉ China already has its own uranium supplies. It can refine uranium, has uranium ore, and has enriched uranium. So why would it still spend so much money to buy uranium?

$400,000 for 2 kilograms is an extremely high price.

The route “Georgia ➔ Russia ➔ China” may simply be based on what the suspects claimed, and it may not reflect the real plan. It’s also possible that the uranium was never intended to be brought back to China. Instead, it may have been meant for nearby proliferation to Iran or terrorist groups in the Middle East, which would involve far less transportation risk.

Remember, Iran’s Khamenei is still openly boasting that Iran possesses nuclear weapons, and remnants of Hamas are still fiercely resisting Israel. This is unlikely to be an empty bluff.

These Chinese agents may have traveled from China through Russia to Georgia, purchased uranium on the Georgian black market, and then transferred it to Iran or to terrorist groups that act as proxies for the Chinese Communist Party.

The narrative that these agents were “bringing it back to China” serves two purposes:

It helps reduce the appearance of China engaging in nuclear proliferation, and
It creates room for China to operate in Georgia by allowing Beijing to request the extradition of the arrested individuals.
Based on what the insider “Thunder” of the CCP revealed that Xi Jinping and his office (“Xi Office”) maintain direct contacts with agents of terrorist organizations such as Khamenei and Hamas, it is highly likely that, behind this case, the CCP was actually trying to sell uranium at a high price to its proxy groups in the Middle East, such as Iran.

The $400,000 did not come from China, but from the proxy organization seeking to buy the uranium. Since the entire operation was orchestrated by the CCP, and to make the transaction safer, both sides were represented by Chinese nationals. For the sake of secrecy, the CCP used the black-market channel, and Georgia was just the transaction location.

Seen this way, the question of why China, a country that already has uranium reserves, uranium mines, and the ability to enrich uranium, would spend $400,000 on just 2 kilograms of uranium now becomes clear: China was not buying uranium; it was selling uranium.

04｜Russia’s role in this incident is very subtle

Georgia’s released information claims that this batch of uranium was supposed to pass through Russia on its way to China. If Russia knows this, how would it react?

Why is Russia’s own nuclear-security system so vulnerable that the CCP can openly move nuclear materials in and out of the country?
The CCP, which always proclaims itself to be Russia’s “filial son and loyal partner,” dared to transport such dangerous nuclear material into Russia from Georgia, a country hostile to Russia. Does this mean the CCP intends to harm Russia?
In the broader geopolitical context where Trump could either ally with China against Russia or ally with Russia against the CCP, Russia will be extremely nervous and is likely to respond proactively.
The so-called “no limits” partnership between China and Russia has already shattered into pieces.

05｜How to interpret several recent developments related to Russia’s “nuclear” activities?
❶ Today, Russian President Putin signed a decree officially terminating Russia’s “Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement”
The “Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement” was a crucial post–Cold War nuclear arms reduction pact aimed at having both sides destroy excess plutonium. Although this agreement had effectively been suspended since 2016, Putin’s signature now signifies its complete termination.

❷ Russia announced that its nuclear-powered cruise missile, “Poseidon,” has completed a critical test launch and is entering the deployment preparation phase.

◉ This is not like the Chinese propaganda claims that “Russia and the U.S. have fallen out again, the U.S.-Russia alliance failed.” To fully understand this, we need a comprehensive view. First, the Russian envoy who was sanctioned by the U.S. has been given a green light and is currently active in Washington, D.C. Moreover, Russia has explicitly stated that it is waiting for the U.S. to set a time for a Trump-Putin meeting. Both sides have emphasized avoiding “pointless meetings,” which means that before meeting again, both parties will first confront Xi Jinping in person to gauge his reaction before discussing cooperation.

Two weeks ago, Putin called Trump and proactively raised the issue of “denuclearization.” If U.S.-Russia relations had truly deteriorated to the extent suggested, such interactions would not be possible.

◉ Russia has officially terminated the “Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement,” which had been suspended for 10 years. This move came after Putin observed U.S. capabilities at Fordow, subsequently met Trump in Alaska, and then proactively raised the issue of “denuclearization.” Russia recognizes that the original plutonium agreement had become meaningless. Now, the focus of U.S.-Russia cooperation is global “denuclearization.” Moreover, the plutonium agreement was only a bilateral U.S.-Russia deal; the new standards and agreements are designed to extend denuclearization efforts to China as well.

Additionally, by terminating an already frozen agreement, Russia is executing a strategic ruse to gauge Xi Jinping and the CCP’s reaction, making Xi believe that U.S.-Russia relations have deteriorated and that he has gained an advantage, which may lead him to reveal more of his ambitions.

Regarding Russia’s deployment of the nuclear-powered cruise missile “Sea Hawk,” Russian officials have stated it will not affect U.S.-Russia relations, and the U.S. is not concerned. Both sides understand that such a weapon does not threaten the United States. Instead, it provides Russia leverage against China, which currently has no means of resistance. Meanwhile, the CCP remains oblivious, celebrating blindly.